Introduction : nation-building in China and Vietnam. by Sutherland,  Claire
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
15 March 2013
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Sutherland, Claire (2012) ’Introduction : nation-building in China and Vietnam.’, East Asia., 29 (1). pp. 1-13.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12140-011-9171-y
Publisher’s copyright statement:
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Introduction: Nation-building in China and Vietnam 
This special issue explores the changing nature of Chinese and Vietnamese nation-
building in the era of globalisation and specifically, transnationalism. The concept of 
transnationalism encompasses migration, diaspora and much more, from complex trade 
routes and capital flows to a concomitant growth in alternative social formations, virtual 
communities, multiple identities and the like. At the same time, however, the 
transnational “signifies the resilience of nations and the state” ([6], p. 599) because the 
concept of ‘trans-national’ also presupposes the existence of national borders to be 
crossed. It informs contemporary nation-building both across and within nation-state 
borders, since migration and multiculturalism also highlight the “transnationality that is 
arising inside nation-states” ([5], p. 389). This is what makes transnationalism a 
particularly useful frame of reference in the context of this special issue, which looks at 
its implications in two specific cases of nation-building. As two of the few communist 
regimes to have survived the end of the Cold War, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(SRV) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are particularly interesting examples 
of pragmatic “nation building at the intersections of socialism and free market capitalism 
([27], p. 19). Colonialism, communism and conflict, prevailing discourses on 
modernization and development, enduring concerns over national sovereignty and 
security, and latterly consumption and technology have all shaped these states’ unique 
approaches to nation-building in a transnational context. In terms of the conceptual 
framework set out below, East and Southeast Asia have also been remarkably fruitful 
regions for theorising nation and identity [12], providing the basis for Benedict 
Anderson’s seminal book Imagined Communities [1], as well as more recent, influential 
works like Aihwa Ong’s Flexible Citizenship [19].  
Vietnam has experienced lengthy colonisation, division and significant emigration, but 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has nonetheless built a national narrative of 
overriding unity founded on an ancient, Bronze Age civilisation and two millennia of 
repeated resistance to foreign invasion [22]. Despite China’s long-standing, self-
ascribed status as the ‘middle kingdom’ at the centre of a hierarchical cosmology, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today emphasises and defends the PRC’s sovereignty 
in standard Westphalian terms, much like its Vietnamese counterpart ([2], p. 133). The 
first part of the following discussion sets out a conceptual framework designed to put 
contemporary Chinese and Vietnamese nation-building in comparative, international 
perspective. Drawing on the twin facets of transnationalism highlighted above, the 
second part looks at the borders of nation-building from the perspective of diasporas 
living outwith the nation-state. In turn, the third part focuses on a series of trends 
working to reinterpret the nation from within, and ends with an overview of contributions 
to this special issue. It should become clear that transnationalism affects contemporary 
nation-building in manifold ways and that the specific cases of China and Vietnam, in all 
their complexity, offer a stimulating basis for wider comparisons.   
Nation-building: The International Context 
Transnationalism refers to “sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-
state actors based across national borders – businesses, non-government 
organizations, and individuals sharing the same interests” ([34], p. 3), as distinct from 
international exchanges between states. It can also be distinguished from globalisation, 
in that transnationalism focuses on the way in which specific culturally and politically 
embedded identities evolve in their interaction with others ([19], p. 4). Diaspora 
communities are one such manifestation of transnationalism and are considered further 
below. The trend towards recognising diasporas as full or quasi citizens of the ‘home’ 
country, with the more or less overt goal of tapping into their investment potential and 
business knowhow [4], has been described as ‘deterritorialised citizenship’ [8; 9] and is 
particularly relevant to nation-building. Deterritorialised citizenship is also something of 
a misnomer, however, precisely because the homeland territory, in the form of the 
nation-state, continues to play a crucial role in defining and delimiting belonging. That is, 
in terms of eligibility for citizenship, the state still decides who is deemed part of the 
national diaspora, and according to which criteria. A more useful alternative to 
deterritorialised citizenship is the concept of ‘kinetic nationalism’ developed by Kate 
Jellema [11] with particular reference to Vietnam. This better captures the flexibility and 
fluidity of nation-building in the twenty-first century context of transnationalism.  
Nation-building is understood here as state-led nationalism, which seeks to forge and 
maintain a link between nation and state. As such, the criteria for belonging to the 
nation-state will necessarily be ideologically laden [31]. The term ‘nationality’ is often 
used as a synonym of state citizenship, indicating how closely the legal construct of  
citizenship is bound up with the presumption of a common national identity. Nationality 
more properly refers to members of a nation and not a state ([21], p. 38), however, and 
it is crucial to distinguish between these two concepts. The nation refers to the 
cognitive, legitimating basis for authority, whereas the state embodies the territorial and 
institutional dimensions of authority. Citizenship, in turn, is an important marker of 
belonging to the state and can be defined as the legal expression of national 
membership, which flows from the nation-state nexus. It thereby “entails the entitlement 
to belong to a community” ([35] p. 22), as well as legal rights and obligations. This 
rather diffuse sense of belonging, sometimes described as ‘cultural citizenship’ ([25], p. 
14), is key in connecting national loyalty to state legitimacy, and underpins the nation-
state construct as a whole.  
The controversial phenomenon of migration is important to nation-building because the 
relationship between migrants and the national construct must be managed. States set 
parameters as to how migrants should ‘integrate’ into the ‘host’ society, principally 
through naturalisation procedures, required language competence and citizenship tests. 
In pursuit of nation-building, they decide how inclusive to make their national construct 
and erect higher or lower barriers to belonging accordingly. Official attitudes towards 
migrants are thus a good way of gauging the openness or otherwise of a national 
construct to new citizens. Turning to diaspora, this denotes a group of migrants who 
share a common bond to the homeland they or their forebears left behind. Not all 
migrants belong to a diaspora, however, because they might not identify with their 
country of (ancestral) origin. Neither can we assume that a diaspora represents a 
homogenous group. Members of a diaspora will feel and express their sense of 
belonging to the homeland in different ways, be it through upholding its customs and 
cultural traditions, some form of political activism, or economic solidarity in providing 
remittances and other types of financial support. Diaspora and migration are thus key 
aspects of transnationalism affecting nation-building today. 
The extension of nation-state citizenship to diaspora communities is not a new 
phenomenon. West Germany’s recognition of Aussiedler, its ethnic German diaspora 
beyond the erstwhile Iron Curtain, is a case in point. Greece’s links with its diaspora 
during the nineteenth century is another. Italy’s recognition of overseas Italian citizens is 
also long-standing, and India’s development of a policy towards overseas Persons of 
Indian Origin is ongoing [4]. In the present era, contrary to the once popular view that 
globalisation would lead to the decline of the nation-state [18], we have instead seen a 
renegotiation of the nation-state construct and its reimagining across frontiers. 
Importantly, these frontiers have not disintegrated. Borders have always been porous, 
but they continue to be important in delimiting the ‘homeland’ and in controlling migrant 
flows, amongst other functions. However, it is increasingly difficult for official nation-
building to present these frontiers as encapsulating a homogenous people and a 
coherent ‘geo-body’ [32]. This is not only because states’ recognition of their diasporas 
oversteps state frontiers, but also because de facto multiculturalism resulting from 
centuries of migration cannot be erased through official integration policies and nation-
building rhetoric alone. It is also becoming increasingly apparent that top-down attempts 
to achieve national unity and solidarity are being renegotiated from within, as scholars 
explore the multivocal nature of nation-building (see Rozsko in this issue).  
Reflecting on some of the trends outlined above, Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider [5] 
have argued that the social sciences must move away from so-called “methodological 
nationalism” - or the focus on bounded ‘nation-states’ as units of analysis - in favour of a 
more cosmopolitan outlook. Somewhat counter-intuitively, perhaps, studies of how 
nation-states are constructed should be no different. Important steps in this direction 
have been taken in the study of Vietnam, exemplified by recent edited volumes entitled 
Borderless Histories [33] and On the Borders of State Power [10]. Complementary work 
on China includes monographs by Callahan [7], Barabantseva [3] and Liu [15] among 
others. Transnational flows have always shaped and influenced nation-states, but the 
growing impact of diaspora and immigration, as well as unofficial national memory and 
commemoration, should be integrated into any study of contemporary nation-building 
[31]. As we shall see in section three below, anthropologists are also developing 
innovative analyses of specific social trends in Vietnam, which suggest new ways of 
thinking about nation-building more generally.   
In the context of contemporary nation-states, the domestic/international distinction is 
breaking down to the extent that diaspora communities abroad are increasingly being 
brought “back into the national fold” ([11], p.70; [4]). However, this tendency towards 
inclusiveness by no means applies to immigrant populations as well. For example, the 
introduction of citizenship tests in the likes of Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Denmark institutionalise an ethnocultural slant to naturalisation. They 
tend to conflate the process of naturalisation with nationality, or ‘cultural citizenship,’ in 
that some of their questions seek to draw out expressions of community solidarity. This 
presupposes a commitment to the nation-state as the “imagined community” writ large, 
which may not reflect the candidates’ actual motivation [19]. Nonetheless, the tests 
officially supplement the legal construct of citizenship with measures of national loyalty 
and belonging. On the one hand, then, we are seeing definitions of national belonging 
extending beyond the nation-state’s territorial boundaries to ‘co-ethnics’. For migrants 
living inside those boundaries, on the other hand, achieving nationality qua citizenship is 
increasingly premised on markers of ethnic belonging, instead of other possible factors 
like residence. Although this can be read as widening the borders of belonging, as is 
suggested by the term ‘deterritorialised citizenship’, it can also be considered 
regressive, since belonging is more often premised on ethnic markers of descent 
(diaspora eligibility) or cultural assimilation (citizenship tests) than purely civic markers 
of residence and/or political participation. Drawing on these wider debates, the following 
section focuses on some of the implications of transnationalism, specifically diasporas, 
for nation-building in Vietnam and China. 
Nation-Building and Diaspora 
Whilst keen to preserve Chinese culture and society from the potentially nefarious 
effects of globalisation, the CCP also attempts to market aspects of Chinese history – 
including colonial remnants - as a means of attracting global business, tourism and 
capital [17]. This strategy targets not only foreign entrepreneurs, visitors and investors, 
but also members of the extensive Chinese diaspora. Although the PRC officially 
embraces its overseas community, Barabantseva points out how this policy is primarily 
directed towards ethnic Han in a hierarchy of ‘true’ belonging. Despite the fact that the 
PRC officially acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity at home, its international 
appeals are unlikely to resonate with those ethnic minorities abroad who do not regard 
themselves as Chinese, nor those who consider the communist regime illegitimate. 
Nevertheless, the PRC’s diaspora policy is part of a wider strategy, detailed by Barr in 
this issue, which is designed to involve overseas Chinese in the country’s 
modernisation and development. As such, it is one example of a ‘deterritorialised’ form 
of nation-building, in that it fosters a sense of national belonging and loyalty to 
transcend borders. Yet the strategy is also very much focused on the fortunes of the 
Chinese ‘homeland’, suggesting that the nation-state and its territory continue to be the 
core concerns. As the following example illustrates, however, some reject the political 
propaganda linking national loyalty to support for the ideology and actions of the 
communist regime.  
The 2008 Olympic games in Beijing were intended to showcase the PRC’s diversity and 
achievements, and drew many donations from overseas Chinese, but also hit the 
headlines as the focus for international protests surrounding the status of Tibet. 
Alongside Taiwan, the PRC’s policies towards Tibet are the most internationally 
controversial aspect of its official nation-building. As the Olympic protests showed, the 
Tibetan diaspora has been very successful in harnessing some of the potential of 
globalisation and transnationalism to its cause. The spiritual appeal of the Dalai Lama 
has also helped to make the Tibetan cause an attractive one for international sponsors. 
From its base in India, the Tibetan government in exile has forged the “diaspora 
ideology of Dharamsala” [13], which presents the Tibetan people in stark opposition to 
the Chinese ‘Other’, not only ethnically and politically, but also ethically and even 
environmentally. This provides an opportunity to cast the PRC in a bad light for 
allegedly destroying Tibetan ecology and landscape [16], thereby combining ‘timeless’ 
and semi-mythical aspects of Tibetan spirituality and culture with ‘progressive’ features 
such as democracy and environmentalism. Tibetan nationalism is thus at once a 
domestic and a transnational challenge facing the PRC’s leadership, as it seeks to 
maintain legitimacy through nation-building.   
Turning to Vietnam, an important segment of its diaspora consists of ‘boat people’ who 
fled the country in the 1970s following communist victory in the Vietnam-American War 
(but see also [29]). Their anti-communism clearly represents a potential ideological 
challenge to the SRV’s official discourse, although the vigour of this challenge varies in 
practice. For example, Louis-Jacques Dorais [9] considers the Vietnamese community 
in Quebec to be much less politicised today than the so-called Viet Kieu (overseas 
Vietnamese) in Southern California, particularly Orange County, for whom anti-
communism can still be an important component of their self-identification. One factor 
influencing politicisation there is the continued control of community associations by 
first-generation Vietnamese exiles, who were often high-ranking officials in the defunct 
Republic of Vietnam [a.k.a. South Vietnam] (but see [11], p. 79). Ong and Meyer’s 
chronicle of the number and nature of protests within this community highlights the 
preponderance of those organized against the SRV government, rather than issues 
surrounding migrant communities or U.S. politics more generally ([20], p. 98). As such, 
“homeward-looking politics has served as a temporary deterrence to the Vietnamese 
state’s effort to reincorporate the diasporic communities and, at the same time, may 
serve as a tool to preserve the history of South Vietnam” ([20], p. 99). Here we see a 
strong counter-narrative to the VCP’s discourse of national unity, which has largely 
erased the country’s division from official commemoration [26].  
Anti-communist protests help to cultivate a distinct Vietnamese identity amongst 
specific diaspora communities, rather than a sense of solidarity with the Vietnamese 
nation-state. Nevertheless, this does not amount to the deterritorialisation of citizenship 
or even national identity, but rather the construction of two rival territories as cultural 
centres for understanding what it means to be Vietnamese. This creates “the 
heartaches of a life split between two homelands” ([11], p. 79), but does not necessarily 
undermine a belief in a single Vietnamese nation independent of its government(s). 
Even when the Republic of Vietnam existed under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem, it 
rivaled its northern neighbour in expressions of patriotism and claims to be the one, true 
representative of the Vietnamese nation ([30], p. 48). Ideological opposition to the 
communist regime has often stood in the way of inward investment or return visits by 
refugees “cautious of the triple threats of pressure from the dominant anti-Hanoi groups 
in the Vietnamese American community, the U.S. government embargo, and continuing 
hardline policies in Hanoi” ([28] p. 4). This started to change after 1986 due to the 
SRV’s process of economic liberalisation known as doi moi (renovation), and is now 
tempered by ever-increasing trade, travel and cultural exchange, as well as evidence of 
lesser political polarisation amongst the younger generation of Viet Kieu ([20], p. 99). 
Similarly to the PRC, Vietnam seeks to strengthen the status of the national ‘homeland’ 
politically and economically by tapping into family ties and ancestral links, since these 
represent continuing connections to Vietnam. A further, significant element of 
“transnational Vietnam” is thus interpersonal (Valverde, cited in [9], p. 109). Repatriation 
to the place of birth for reburial remains an ideal for many Viet Kieu ([9], p. 113), for 
example, although the widespread belief that ancestors’ spirits can be called to visit the 
family shrine - wherever this may be located in the world - very much facilitates the 
transnational conduct of ancestor worship. At the same time, this practice reaffirms a 
sense of belonging to Vietnam, one which official Vietnamese nation-building is now 
seeking to exploit by suggesting that ancestor worship serves to unite all Vietnamese 
across religions and ethnic groups. Indeed, Kate Jellema ([11], p. 72) points out that 
“with a little encouragement [from the state], filial piety in a family context might be 
translated into loyalty to the modern nation.” Further, the link between the related 
practice of spirit worship and patriotism has also been noted. For example, popular 
Vietnamese deities like Lieu Hanh and Tran Hung Dao take on both a spiritual and 
patriotic function in contemporary Vietnam ([23], p. 67).  
Today, Vietnam’s nation-building discourse embraces those deemed to be Vietnamese 
living outside Vietnam with the ultimate goal of increasing the SRV’s prosperity and 
legitimacy as a unified nation-state. This makes the idea of ‘deterritorialised citizenship’ 
as a basis for contemporary nation-building rather misleading. On the contrary, today’s 
nation-builders seek to reaffirm state borders by encouraging their respective diasporas 
to invest themselves both financially and spiritually in improving the fortunes of the 
‘home’ nation-state. These appeals can resonate across the generations, exemplified by 
one young Vietnamese-American quoted as saying “I cannot take away my father’s pain 
[…] and he knows not to try to take away my quest to do something for the country that 
holds my birthright” (cited in [28], p. 7). This section has looked at diasporas to illustrate 
some of the political and interpersonal aspects of transnationalism that shape 
contemporary nation-building in the communist context. The following section draws on 
stimulating anthropological literature on Vietnam to explore the concept of ‘kinetic 
nationalism’ as a possible alternative to notions of deterritorialised citizenship. 
Nation-building: Domestic Dynamics 
Kate Jellema has argued that the Vietnamese case provides evidence of an 
increasingly “flexible ‘coming and going’ engagement with the nation” ([11], p. 58). The 
Vietnamese phrase ve que, meaning return to the homeland, can be understood on 
several levels, but has much to do with rites of filial devotion. For instance, it is used to 
refer to urban migrants within Vietnam, who typically return to their home village for 
lunar new year celebrations. As in China, this is the main, annual family gathering. But 
at the same time, the “disciplining ve (to come back home) contains within it the 
liberating di (to go out), and therein the possibility of a Vietnamese nationalism 
compatible with individual ambition and a global outlook.” ([11], p. 58). This analysis is 
symptomatic of recent anthropological studies of collective memory and religious revival 
in contemporary Vietnam, which have sought to move beyond bounded understandings 
of the nation-state to examine transnational and unofficial forms of commemoration that 
question, complement and sometimes subvert official nation-building.  
Complementing Rozsko’s analysis in this issue, Christina Schwenkel uses the term 
‘recombinant history’ to show how Vietnamese commemoration of the Vietnam-
American war is “a kind of co-production that is bound up in uneven relations of power 
and competing claims to historical authority and truth” ([27], p. 13). Her approach 
explicitly highlights the transnational aspects of this process, tracing how everything 
from museum exhibits to war memorials are influenced by international sensibilities, and 
interpreted differently by foreign and Vietnamese tourists, defeated combatants, and 
younger generations of Vietnamese in the SRV or its diaspora. These are just some of 
the actors who together make up a “historically shifting and patchy transnational 
landscape shaped by the legacies of war, colonialism, nationalism, socialist 
internationalism, and global capitalism” ([27], p. 204). Clearly, the form of nation-building 
Schwenkel describes is eminently flexible and adaptable to the twenty-first century, 
transnational context. According to Kate Jellema, the SRV’s current focus on ancestor 
worship in its nation-building discourse is also closely linked to this context; “to 
counteract the fragmentation of the increasingly global and globalized Vietnamese 
populace by pulling wayward Vietnamese back home […] ancestor worship has to seem 
both appropriately old and appropriately new: at once a time-honoured, naturalized 
tradition and at the same time a flexible concept relevant to contemporary realities” 
([11], p. 72). Both Schwenkel and Jellema show how the SRV’s official nation-building is 
responding to the dynamism and transnationalism of contemporary Vietnamese citizens 
and society. Its emphasis on ancestor worship suggests an ancient, ‘rooted’ pedigree 
well suited to nation-building, but also acknowledges that people are often ‘on the move’ 
and may be unable to visit their ancestors’ tombs more than once a year or even once 
in a lifetime. Others may only be able to summon the spirits across continents, but this 
practice continues to revolve around a longing to return to one’s Vietnamese que or 
home, and by extension to the national homeland. To this extent, it is definitely not a 
‘deterritorialised’ form of belonging. Rather, Jellema’s use of the term ‘kinetic 
nationalism’ is more apt in describing a form of nation-building which accepts departure 
from the homeland but also expects return (as well as financial returns).  
Heonik Kwon’s fascinating analysis of memory and spirituality in the aftermath of the 
Vietnam-American war focuses on the “social vitality” ([14], p. 3) of ghosts in Vietnam. 
He contrasts popular practices of commemoration, which do not distinguish ideologically 
between those who fell, and the state’s need to institute “a hierarchy of value in war 
death for its legitimacy” ([14], p. 25). Remembering those who died in wartime and the 
‘heroic mothers’ who bore them in terms of martyrdom or ‘sacrifice for their country’ is 
an important element of Vietnamese nation-building. For instance, Christina Schwenkel 
([27], p. 130) shows how the design and layout of Vietnamese war memorials display 
both transnational and ‘Vietnamised’ features, and are received more or less warmly by 
different sectors of the population. Significantly, these memorials honour those who died 
for the winning side in the Vietnam-American war, neglecting the tombs of soldiers who 
fought for the also defunct Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, this “rendering of national 
unity as a spiritual unity” ([14], p. 27) between past and present, North and South 
Vietnam is necessarily incomplete. Kwon also shows that outside the political realm, 
popular spiritual practices surrounding ghosts of the fallen do not discriminate on the 
basis of the dead soldier’s origins and affiliation, be they American or communist or not. 
In this apolitical sphere, the ideological divisions of the Cold War are not decisive. Thus, 
individual encounters with ghosts and their impact on families and local villages offer a 
rich complement, if not a corrective, to nation-building discourse surrounding only those 
officially recognised as ‘heroes’ and ‘martyrs’. Kwon’s rich analysis chimes with 
Jellema’s view of kinetic nationalism by pointing out the flexibility of spirit worship, which 
can incorporate ghosts as “another man’s ancestor” ([14], p. 99), thereby offering hope 
of reconciliation extending across both kinship and ideological boundaries to include not 
only the SRV’s diaspora but also its defeated enemies; “In this context, the ritual act of 
hospitality and its openness to displaced foreign spirits can coexist with the 
demonstration of unity with familiar ancestral spirits” [[14], p. 165). The adoption of 
ancestor worship into official Vietnamese nation-building thus holds intriguing potential 
to undermine the political binaries that are inherent in nationalism - such as insider and 
outsider, winner and loser - and to offer new ways of thinking about official national 
belonging and commemoration in the future.  
To the extent that nation-states increasingly seek to foster the same sense of national 
unity, solidarity and loyalty among their diaspora as they do at home, it is quite possible 
to argue that “transnationalism…may rather reinforce traditional nationalism through a 
deterritorialized expansion of the nation-state” ([8], p. 172) However, it can also have 
the opposite effect. Enduring loyalty to a putative ‘free Vietnam’ rather than the SRV 
among some Vietnamese-Americans is a case in point. This ideological division still 
hinders an overriding sense of solidarity with the Vietnamese people in some parts of 
the diaspora. SRV nation-building is now trying to transcend this by emphasising a 
shared belief in ancestor worship uniting all compatriots across the world. Vietnamese 
identity is well adapted to displacement and diaspora, since it can be acted out 
transnationally, but it is not a deterritorialised form of belonging, since it continues to 
have the nation-state ‘homeland’ at its symbolic centre. Accordingly, ‘kinetic nationalism’ 
is a more helpful analytical term to suit contemporary circumstances. It presupposes 
that individuals’ pursuit of prosperity and legitimacy will benefit the ‘home’ nation-state, 
even if the means used to achieve this are increasingly transnational. All of the 
contributions to this special issue explore aspects of Chinese and Vietnamese nation-
building that are relevant to this twenty-first century context.   
Overview of Contributions 
John Whitmore’s memoir of his visit to wartime Hanoi in the aftermath of US bombing in 
late 1972 offers a unique perspective on Vietnamese nation-building. As a respected 
scholar of premodern Vietnam, he enjoyed privileged access to the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV) intellectual elite at the moment when official reaction to the 
US bombing was first being formulated. Whitmore’s account clearly demonstrates how 
this was woven into a wider “heroic historical narrative” of resistance to foreign invasion. 
For instance, dubbing the B-52 bombardments “the Dien Bien Phu of the skies” directly 
linked them to the decisive Vietnamese victory over French colonial forces, which led to 
the Geneva peace agreement of 1954. While in Hanoi, Whitmore heard of the 1973 
Paris peace agreement ending US involvement in the war and witnessed how this was 
also presented to the assembled international press as an integral part of several 
thousand years of history. Inspired by the ongoing war and translated for Chinese, 
Cuban, Japanese, Swedish and US ears, there could be no more vivid evocation of the 
transnational impact of nation-building. In the official DRV view, this was “the latest 
battle in their country’s long and continuing fight for unity and independence,” a fight 
which would not end until the 30th of April 1975. The same nation-building narrative has 
persisted from wartime to the present day, though Edyta Rozsko illustrates its evolution 
into a more multivocal discourse. 
Rozsko’s article begins by examining the VCP’s changing attitude towards religious 
practice as an element of national heritage and a component in its own nation-building 
discourse. The very title of the VCP’s “Resolution No. 5 on Building a Progressive 
Culture, Imbued with National Identity” clearly indicates its prescriptive approach to 
marrying ‘progressive’ modernisation with national loyalty and patriotism. Rozsko’s 
empirical analysis eschews a limited view of ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ drivers in this 
process, emphasising instead how different sets of people and state representatives 
can be both influenced by and influential in the staging of “a national drama in which 
religion plays its part.” Rozsko concludes that contemporary nation-building is indeed 
flexible, negotiated, contested and sometimes even responsive to personal narratives, 
which individuals successfully manage to integrate into official histories. The 
“institutionalization of religion serves the state’s purpose to legitimize its power and 
engage people […] and foster a sense of national unity”, but groups and individuals also 
pursue their own agendas, which may or may not coincide with those of the state 
organs they encounter (e.g. at the local level).  
Turning to citizens commonly considered to have played little part in Vietnam’s nation-
building narrative, Rupert Friederichsen considers the “mixed blessings of national 
integration” for ethnic minorities in the country’s northern uplands. He sets out to qualify 
the widely held view of their marginalisation with a much more nuanced approach, 
which characterises uplanders’ experience as a struggle stemming from their 
ambiguous attitude towards authority and patchy state policy implementation, amongst 
other factors. Although the official Vietnamese view is that ethnic minorities should be 
integrated into the nation-building project, common prejudices towards ethnic minorities 
as inferior still persist, and influence the state’s development agenda in the northern 
uplands. Drawing on James C. Scott’s recent work on Zomia, Friederichsen points out 
that uplanders have been adept at evading but also adapting state strictures on a “case-
by-case basis, reflecting local strategising and circumstances”. As Friederichsen shows, 
policies such as (de)collectivisation and deforestation are clearly linked to prevailing 
nation-building discourse and uplanders’ perceived place within it. His analysis chimes 
with that of both Barabantseva and Rozsko in this volume, by illustrating the 
“civilizational hierarchy of ethnic groups” instituted by the state on the one hand, and 
uplanders’ ability to avoid or resist some of its policy effects on the other. As 
Friederichsen’s account of a private partnership between an ethnic Vietnamese trader 
and an upland village demonstrates, official policy agendas may be helped or hindered 
in unexpected and patchy ways, further highlighting the need to integrate individual 
agency into analyses of contemporary nation-building.   
Turning to the Chinese case, Elena Barabantseva complements Friederichsen’s 
analysis of development discourse in Vietnam with a similar focus on the interplay 
between Chinese models of modernisation and nation-building. Supported by close 
readings of an influential government report and National Day parades staged primarily 
for domestic public consumption, she argues that official PRC claims to be pursuing a 
unique development path are actually highly misleading. Instead, she documents the 
PRC’s strong tendency to adopt linear models of progress which implicitly measure its 
stage of development against Western, industrialised societies, and impose a 
civilisational hierarchy on the PRC’s own ethnic minorities. In both the empirical cases 
discussed, the same use of the Yangtze river as a metaphor is particularly arresting and 
strongly suggests that the PRC may have adapted its rhetoric to appeal to Chinese 
sensibilities, but does not challenge well-entrenched imperial and development 
discourses regarding the one, ‘true’ path to development. Barabantseva concludes that 
such “a limited approach to development excludes the possibility of multiple and 
different modernities within or outside China.” She points out the need to question 
assumptions underlying this view and acknowledge different perspectives and 
experiences of modernization, in order to promote a more inclusive and less prejudiced 
form of nation-building. 
Michael Barr conducts a related analysis of Chinese nation-building in terms of national 
branding and the conceptual framework of soft power. Although his focus is on efforts to 
market the PRC abroad through a Confucius revival, the Shanghai Expo and national 
publicity films for international audiences, he argues that these are “part and parcel of 
Beijing’s nation building exercises to instil loyalty to the Party brand and strengthen 
Beijing’s own legitimacy”. These measures are thus designed to promote national 
cohesion as well as national competitiveness, thereby increasing the government’s 
standing both at home and abroad. The mutual influence evident here highlights the 
importance of transnationalism to contemporary nation-building; “China’s attention to 
soft power is co-produced through its domestic and international concerns,” a key 
element of which is creating “loyalty to a communal identity”. This, together with the 
government’s painstaking attempts to emphasise its peaceful rise, serves to create a 
positive image of the national brand through measures as diverse as celebrity 
endorsements, spotlights on consumer goods, and the reinterpretation of Confucius’ 
legacy. All are packaged as sources of national pride, freed of negative connotations 
and unabashed about anachronistic or skewed representations. Importantly, they all 
testify to a heightened understanding of the increasingly ‘relational’, or transnational 
nature of sovereignty and nation-building.   
A final perspective on the transnational nature of nation-building comes from Elena 
Atanassova-Cornelis, who focuses on the role of Chinese foreign policy, specifically 
towards Japan and the US. Constructing the ‘Other’ as somehow different or dangerous 
is a well-entrenched nation-building strategy, and Atanassova-Cornelis’ analysis builds 
on this to show how Japan and the US have been key components in a three-pronged 
national narrative of victimhood, modernisation and future great power status. Designed 
to bolster the CCP’s attempts to “preserve its legitimacy and ensure domestic stability in 
the post-Cold War era,” this linear, tripartite story illuminates further facets of nation-
building in the PRC, and is closely bound up with the trends documented by both Barr 
and Barabantseva. As Atanassova-Cornelis puts it, “Beijing’s nation-building efforts 
have included a strengthening of the victimisation narrative in Chinese national identity 
and the promotion of official patriotism” through the portrayal of Japan as the invading, 
imperialist ‘Other’. In this narrative, Taiwan provides an important lynchpin between past 
events and current affairs, including continuing tensions with the US over its close 
relations to the island state. The US also looms large in the discourse surrounding the 
PRC’s present and future development, which Barabantseva already established as a 
crucial component of nation-building. Atanassova-Cornelis complements this from the 
PRC’s security perspective, which is centred on protecting its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and interests. The PRC’s self-projection is carefully balanced so as not to alarm 
the international community, whilst satisfying its domestic audience that the country 
commands respect on the world stage as a major military and economic power. This 
takes us back to the ‘pragmatic nation-building’ mentioned at the beginning of this 
introduction, which Atanassova-Cornelis documents in her account of the CCP’s 
strategic choices to stoke or placate popular xenophobic sentiments.  
Together, the articles in this special issue offer fascinating insights into the flexibility and 
dynamism of contemporary nation-building, which combines ideological elements with 
strategic pragmatism. Both the SRV and the PRC share a continued concern with 
preserving state sovereignty and national legitimacy, but they do so within an 
increasingly transnational frame of reference. On the one hand, the barriers between 
residents and diasporic ‘Others’ are being broken down, while the US, Japanese (or 
Chinese, in the Vietnamese case) ‘Other’ is built up as a potential existential threat. 
What is certain is that nation-building policy and practice are not on the wane in the era 
of globalisation and transnationalism. On the contrary, rapidly developing nation-states 
like China and Vietnam seem open to using international technology, finance and 
expertise to pursue their modernisation projects, while seeking to preserve their one-
party political system at the same time. The resulting forms of nation-building are an 
intriguing blend of commercial branding and religious revival, historical iconography and 
breackneck expansion, still seasoned with socialist rhetoric. Vietnam and China are 
adapting contemporary trends for their own, apparently old-fashioned purpose, namely 
the continued legitimation of their respective nation-states.    
References 
1. Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities 2nd Edn. London; Verso 
2. Barabantseva, E. (2009) ‘Change vs. Order: Shijie meets Tianxia in China’s interactions with the 
world’ in Alternatives Vol. 34 pp. 129-55 
3. Barabantseva, E. (2010). Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-Centering China. 
London: Routledge. 
4. Barabantseva, E. & Sutherland, C. (2011) ‘Introduction; Diaspora and Citizenship’ in Journal of 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics Vol. 17(1) pp. 1-13 
5. Beck, U. & Sznaider, N. (2010 [2006]) ‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a 
research agenda’ in British Journal of Sociology Vol. 60 pp. 381-403 
6. Binnie, J. (2003) ‘Locating transnationalism: agency and method’ in Sociology Vol. 37 (3) pp. 599-
604 
7. Callahan, W. (2006) Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific-Asia, Routledge: London & New 
York  
8. Dorais, L-J. (2005) ‘From Refugees to Transmigrants; the Vietnamese in Canada’ in Anderson, W. & 
Lee, R. (eds.) Displacements & Diasporas, Rutgers   
9. Dorais, L-J. (2010) Politics, Kinship, and Ancestors: Some Diasporic Dimensions of the Vietnamese 
Experience in North America in Journal of Vietnamese Studies Vol. 5 (2), pp. 91-132 
10. Gainsborough, M. (ed.) (2009) On the Borders of State Power, Routledge; Abingdon & New York 
11. Jellema, K. (2007) ‘Returning Home: Ancestor veneration and the nationalism of doi moi Vietnam’ in 
Taylor, P. (ed.) Modernity and Re-enchantment: religion in post-revolutionary Vietnam, Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies; Singapore 
12. King, V. (2006) ‘Southeast Asia: Personal Reflections on a Region’ in Chou, C & Houben, V. (eds.) 
Southeast Asian Studies: Debates and New Directions, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore 
13. Klieger, P. C. (2002) ‘Introduction’ in Klieger, P.C. (ed.) Tibet, Self and the Tibetan Diaspora, Brill; 
Leiden, Boston, Cologne 
14. Kwon, H. (2008) Ghosts of War in Vietnam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
15. Liu, X. (2010) Recast all under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th 
Century; Continuum, New York 
16. Magnusson, J. (2002) ‘A Myth of Tibet: Reverse Orientalism and Soft Power’ in Klieger, P.C. (ed.) 
Tibet, Self and the Tibetan Diaspora, Brill; Leiden, Boston, Cologne  
17. Marinelli, M. (2009) ‘Making Concessions in Tianjin: Heterotopia and Italian Colonialism in Mainland 
China (1860-1945)’ in Urban History 
18. Ohmae, K. (1996) The End of the Nation-State New York; Free Press 
19. Ong, A. (1999) Flexible Citizenship Duke University Press; Durham NC & London 
20. Ong, N. & Meyer, D. (2008) ‘Protest and Political Incorporation: Vietnamese American Protests in 
Orange County, California, 1975–2001’ in Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 3 (1), pp. 78-107  
21. Oommen, T.K.  (1997) ‘Introduction’ in Oommen, T.K. (ed.) Citizenship and National Identity, 
Sage; New Delhi, Thousand Oaks & London 
22. Pelley, P. (2002) Postcolonial Vietnam: Visions of the Present and Past, Duke University Press; 
Durham 
23. Pham, Q. & Eipper, C. (2009) ‘Mothering and Fathering the Vietnamese: Religion, Gender, and 
National Identity’ in Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 49-83  
24. Piller, I. (2001) ‘Naturalization language testing and its basis in ideologies of national identity and 
citizenship’ in International Journal of Bilingualism Vol. 5 (3) pp. 259-277 
25. Rosaldo, R. (2003) ‘Introduction; the Borders of Belonging’ in Rosaldo, R. (ed.) Cultural citizenship 
in island Southeast Asia: nation and belonging in the hinterlands, Berkeley; University of 
California Press 
26. Schwenkel, C. (2008) ‘Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representation and 
Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam’ in Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 
Vol. 3 (1) pp. 36–77 
27. Schwenkel, C. (2009) The American War in Contemporary Vietnam, Indiana University Press; 
Bloomington & Indianapolis 
28. Sidel, M. (2007) ‘Vietnamese-American Diaspora Philanthropy to Vietnam’ at: 
http://www.tpi.org/resources/white_papers/vietnamese_american_diaspora_philanthropy.aspx, 
last accessed 25th July 2011 
29. Sutherland, C (2007) ‘Digesting Diasporas: Vietnamese Migrants and German Multiculturalism’ in 
Ní Éigeartaigh, A. et al (eds.) Rethinking Diasporas: Hidden Narratives and Imagined Borders, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 39-51 
30. Sutherland, C. (2010) Soldered States: Nation-building in Vietnam and Germany, Manchester 
University Press; Manchester 
31. Sutherland, C. (2012) Nationalism in the twenty-first century, Palgrave; Basingstoke 
32. Thongchai, W. (1994) Siam Mapped; A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, Silkworm; Chiang Mai 
33. Tran, N. T. & Reid, A. (eds) (2006) Vietnam: Borderless Histories, University of Wisconsin Press: 
Madison 
34. Vertovec. S. (2009) Transnationalism, London & New York; Routledge 
35. Wiener, A. (1998) 'European' citizenship practice: building institutions of a non-state, Westview; 
Boulder, CO & Oxford 
